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*Authoecific cooperation and interspecific mutualism often feature an asymmetry in the scope for
ation. We investigate the evolution of indirect reciprocity in an asymmetric game, loosely modelled
ractions between cleaner fishes and clients, in which ‘actors’ can choose to help or to exploit a
nt’ that approaches them, while recipients can only choose whether or not to approach an actor
on the observation of its behaviour towards others). We show that when actors vary in state over
a manner that influences the potential gains from exploitation, an equilibrium is possible at which
nts avoid actors whom they have observed exploiting others in the past, and actors help when the
al gains from exploitation are low but choose to exploit when the potential gains are high. In this
t, helping is favoured not because it elicits reciprocal altruism (‘help so that you may be helped’), but
e it facilitates profitable exploitation (‘help so that you may gain the opportunity to harm’). The cost
ing one recipient is thereby recouped through exploitation of another. Indirect reciprocity is thus
e even in asymmetric interactions in which one party cannot directly ‘punish’ exploitation or
’ helping by the other.
rds: indirect reciprocity; image scoring; social prestige; altruism; asymmetric game; tactical deceptionKeywo1. INTRODUCTION
Humans often help unrelated individuals even when it is
unlikely that the recipient will reciprocate such favours in
the future. Alexander (1987) proposed that apparently
altruistic behaviour may prove beneficial under these
circumstances if the helper gains an improved ‘image’,
which increases the probability that some other individual
will help the original helper in the future. Reciprocity in
this case is not direct between helper and recipient but
indirect between helper and third parties. Similarly,
Zahavi (1995) and Roberts (1998) used Zahavi’s handicap
principle (Zahavi 1975) to argue that apparent altruism
may serve as an honest signal of quality, which increases
the ‘prestige’ of the helper, and may increase its mating
success or encourage others to interact favourably with it.
The idea of ‘image scoring’ has been formalized by
Nowak & Sigmund (1998a,b) and Leimar & Hammerstein
(2001), who have shown that indirect reciprocity is indeed
evolutionarily plausible (although it is necessary that
changes in an individual’s image or standing reflect not
only whether or not it is seen to help, but also the standing
of those whom it helps or refrains from helping). Similarly,
Lotem et al. (2003) have modelled the idea of social
prestige, demonstrating that when individuals vary in
state, such that some find helping more costly than others,
then those for whom the costs are low may profit by
helping recipients that cannot reciprocate, because in
doing so they advertise their state and thereby attract
potential partners that are capable of reciprocation.r for correspondence (raj1003@hermes.cam.ac.uk).Empirical support for indirect reciprocity among
humans was first obtained in experiments conducted by
Wedekind & Milinski (2000), who examined the
behaviour of undergraduate students in a game based on
the model of Nowak & Sigmund (1998a), and found that
individuals who were more altruistic also received more
help from others and ended up with a higher net pay-off
than those who were less helpful (see Semmann et al.
2004, 2005 for further evidence).
The above models assume, however, that all players
have similar behavioural options, and are thus capable of
reciprocation. In reality, by contrast, many examples of
intraspecific cooperation or interspecific mutualism
feature marked asymmetries between partners in the
opportunity for exploitation (see references in Bshary &
Grutter (2002) and Bshary & Bronstein (2004)). The first
evidence for image scoring in species other than our own,
for instance, comes from work on a cleaning mutualism
involving the cleaner wrasse Labroides dimidiatus (Bshary
2002; Bshary & D’Souza 2004; Bshary & Grutter 2006),
in which opportunities for exploitation are entirely one-
sided. In this mutualism, ‘client’ reef fishes visit cleaners at
their small territories (cleaning stations) so that the latter
may remove ectoparasites (reviewed by Coˆte´ (2000)).
Conflict arises because cleaners prefer to eat client tissue
and mucus rather than ectoparasites (Grutter & Bshary
2003). While cleaners do not exploit predatory clients in
this way, non-predatory clients are often exploited (Bshary
2001), and a minority of cleaners may switch back and
forth between a cleaning and a biting strategy (Bshary
2002; Bshary & D’Souza 2004). The clients in question
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2lack the capacity to retaliate in kind. Nevertheless, a way
avoid cleaners in biting mood is to watch the interaction
a cleaner with its current client and to invite inspection
no conflict is observed but otherwise to avoid the cleane
The Cleaners have up to 2300 interactions per d
(Grutter 1995), so interactions often take place in t
presence of bystanders that could gain the releva
information (i.e. they form part of a communicatio
network in which eavesdropping is possible; see McGreg
1993, 2005). The experimental evidence supports the id
that clients pay attention to ongoing interactions as well
to the consequent prediction that cleaners should be mo
cooperative to their current client in the presence
bystanders (Bshary & Grutter 2006).
The cleaner wrasse example suggests that ima
scoring may be important even when helpful (
exploitative) acts cannot be directly rewarded (or pu
ished) by third-party help (or exploitation), but inste
influence whether or not an individual will gain t
opportunity for further interactions. To address th
possibility, we explore in §2 the dynamics of indire
reciprocity in an asymmetric game that is loosely based o
cleaner–client interactions, but is relevant also to ma
other instances of intraspecific cooperation and inte
specific mutualism that involve two distinct class
of traders, only one of which has the option to help
harm the other.en
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er2. THE MODEL
Our model focuses on pairwise interactions betwe
‘actors’ (cleaners) and ‘recipients’ (clients), over a lar
number of rounds. In each round, actors and recipien
are paired at random (we assume that the possibility
repeated encounters between the same two individuals
negligible), and the recipient in each pair decides wheth
to evade or to approach the actor. Evasion yields a pay-o
of zero for both players; if the recipient approaches, t
pay-offs that each obtain depend upon the subseque
behaviour of the actor, which may choose to ‘help’ or
‘harm’.
The pay-off to the recipient is assumed to be positive
the actor helps and negative if the actor harms; t
solution of the model depends only on the cost (to t
recipient) of harm relative to the benefit of help, which w
will denote c. The pay-off to the actor, however, depen
not only on its action but also on its ‘state’ (which is n
directly observable by the recipient). For simplicity, w
assume that only two states are possible (1 or 2) and th
there is some probability of switching between them fro
one round to the next; the probability of switching fro
state i to the alternative is denoted si (where 0!si!0.5
We will assume that harming the recipient yields
exploitative benefit to the actor, the magnitude of which
denoted xi when in state i; while helping entails a cost, t
magnitude of which is denoted yi when in state i. W
assume (without loss of generality) that the temptation
exploit is greater when in state 1, so that x1Ox2.
Finally, we assume that if an actor harms a recipient
any given round, this is observed with probability e (whe
0!e!1) by the recipient with whom it is paired during t
next round.(a) Solving the model
We are interested in the possibility of an equilibrium
which the behaviour of actors is conditional upon the
state, such that they help recipients only when in state
(when exploitation is less profitable) and harm recipien
only when in state 1 (when exploitation is more profi
able), and in which recipients only approach an actor if
was not seen to harm a recipient in the previous round
Suppose, then, that actors and recipients adopt the
strategies. Let fiC(n) denote the probability that an actor
in state i at the start of round n and was not observ
harming a recipient in the previous round; fiK(n) denot
the probability that an actor is in state i and was observ
harming a recipient in the previous round. The pro
abilities f1C(n), f1K(n), f2C(n) and f2K(n) will then chan
from one round to the next according to the followi
difference equations:
f1CðnC1ÞZ f1CðnÞð1K s1Þð1KeÞC f1KðnÞð1K s1Þ
C f2CðnÞs2C f2KðnÞs2; ð2:1
f1KðnC1ÞZ f1CðnÞð1K s1Þe; ð2:1
f2CðnC1ÞZ f1CðnÞs1ð1KeÞC f1KðnÞs1
C f2CðnÞð1K s2ÞC f2KðnÞð1K s2Þ
ð2:1
and
f2KðnC1ÞZ f1CðnÞs1e: ð2:1
Note that an actor that was observed harming a recipie
in the previous round will not be approached, an
therefore has no opportunity to harm a recipient in t
current round. As a result, a ‘negative image’ cann
persist from one round to the next, which is why t
expressions for f1K(nC1) and f2K(nC1) given
equations (2.1b) and (2.1d ) contain no terms involvi
f1K(n) or f2K(n). The above probabilities converge, ov
time, to the values
f^ 1CZ
s2
s1C s2
1
1C ð1K s1Þe
f^ 1KZ
s2
s1C s2
ð1K s1Þe
1C ð1K s1Þe
f^ 2CZ
s1
s1C s2
1C ð1K s1K s2Þe
1C ð1K s1Þe and
f^ 2KZ
s1
s1C s2
s2e
1C ð1K s1Þe :
ð2:2Þ
The pay-off to a recipient from approaching an actor that
was not seen to harm its partner in the previous round thus
converges to
f^ 2CKf^ 1Cc
f^ 2CC f^ 1C
Z
s1 1C ð1K s1K s2Þe
 
Kcs2
s1 1C ð1K s1K s2Þe
 
C s2
; ð2:3Þ
while the pay-off from approaching an actor that was seen
to harm its partner in the previous round converges to
f^ 2KKf^ 1Kc
f^ 2KC f^ 1K
Z s1Kð1K s1Þc: ð2:4Þ
Taking the long-term average pay-off per round (over a
large number of rounds) as our measure of fitness, the
conditional approach strategy adopted by recipients is
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3therefore strictly optimal if and only if
f^ 2CKf^ 1Cc
f^ 2CC f^ 1C
O0O
f^ 2KKf^ 1Kc
f^ 2KC f^ 1K
5
s1
s2
1C ð1K s1K s2Þe
 
OcO
s1
1K s1
ð2:5Þ
To assess the stability of the conditional helping strategy
adopted by actors requires slightly more calculation. In
appendix A, however, we show that if we take the long-
term average pay-off per round (over a large number of
rounds) as our measure of fitness once again, then the
conditional helping strategy is strictly optimal if and only if
x1O
1C ð1K s1Þe
s2e
x2C
ð1CeÞ 1C ð1K s1K s2Þe
 
s2e
y2:
ð2:6Þ
Provided, therefore, that conditions (2.5) and (2.6) are
both satisfied, an equilibrium does indeed exist at which
actors help recipients only when in state 2 (when
exploitation is less profitable) and harm them when in
state 1, and at which recipients only approach an actor if it
was not seen to harm its partner in the previous round.0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
s (switching probability)
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Figure 1. Regions of parameter space in which conditional
helping and approach are stable. (a) The range of values of
s (the probability of switching state, here assumed equal for
both states) and c (the cost to the recipient of harm, relative
to the benefit of help) over which an equilibrium of the kind
considered in the text proves stable, for three different
values of e, the probability that harmful behaviour is
observed: successively darker shading corresponds to
successively lower values of e, 1, 0.75 and 0.5, respectively.
In all cases, x2/x1Z0.1 and y2/x1Z0.05. (b) Equivalent
regions of stability for three different values of x 2/x1, the
temptation to harm when in state 2 relative to that in state 1
successively darker shading corresponds to successively
greater values of x 2/x1, 0.05, 0.1 and 0.15, respectively. In
all cases, eZ0.75 and y2/x1Z0.05.(b) Impact of model parameters
Conditions (2.5) and (2.6) are less easily satisfied when
x2 and/or y2 are larger relative to x1, implying that
harming the recipient yields relatively larger benefits
and/or helping entails relatively larger costs to the actor
when in state 2. The reason for this pattern is intuitively
obvious—the greater the temptation to exploit even
when in state 2 (in which the benefits of exploitation are
smaller), the less likely a strategy of conditional helping
is to prove stable. In addition, conditions (2.5) and (2.6)
are less easily satisfied when e is smaller, implying that
harmful behaviour is less likely to be observed. The
reason is once again clear—it is the possibility that
harmful behaviour will be observed, leading to a
negative image and hence to avoidance by recipients,
that stabilizes helping; consequently, the greater the
chance that harm will go unnoticed, the less likely a
strategy of conditional help is to prove stable.
The impact of the other parameters, c, s1 and s2, is
not so simple. If c, the cost of harm to a recipient
(relative to the benefit of help), is too large, then it can
pay recipients simply to avoid all interaction; con-
versely, if the cost is too small, then it can pay to
approach any and all actors, regardless of their image.
Conditional approach thus proves stable only for
intermediate costs. Turning to the probability of
switching states, increasing values of s1 and s2 favour
conditional helping. Greater switching probabilities
mean that an actor that helps when in state 2 (low
temptation to exploit) and thereby attracts a recipient
in the following round has a greater chance of switching
to state 1 (high temptation) and gaining a large benefit
from exploitation. On the other hand, if the probability
of switching states is too high, then an actor’s behaviour
in the previous round provides a poor guide to its
probable behaviour in the current round, and a strategy
of conditional approach based on image is unlikely to
prove stable.
The above patterns are illustrated in figure 1, which
focuses on the special case in which s1Zs2Zs, so that theprobabilities of switching from each state to the other
are the same, and actors consequently spend equal
amounts of time (over the long term) in each state.
Figure 1a shows the range of values of s (switching
probability) and c (cost to recipients of harm, relative to
the benefit of help) over which conditional helping and
approach prove stable, for different values of e (the
probability that harmful behaviour is observed), and
figure 1b for different values of x2/x1 (the temptation to
harm when in state 2 relative to that in state 1. Crudely,
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4figure 1 shows that, as stated above, stability is mo
likely for intermediate values of c and s, and for high
values of e and lower values of x2/x1.at
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ay3. DISCUSSION
Our model shows that image scoring of individuals th
have the potential to exploit their partners, by individua
that cannot retaliate but that control the occurrence
interactions, can indeed support a form of indire
reciprocity. Under these circumstances, potential explo
ters may do best to refrain from exploiting curre
interaction partners when the benefits of doing so a
smaller, and even to incur short-term costs by acti
helpfully towards them, so as to avoid a negative ima
that would entail less scope for interaction in the futur
Thus, indirect reciprocity is possible even when t
capacity for exploitation is entirely one-sided, as in t
interaction between cleaner wrasse and non-predato
clients described in §1 (and in many other asymmetric
relationships; see Bshary & Grutter 2002 and Bshary
Bronstein 2004). Note that under such circumstance
only members of the potentially exploitative class have
image or prestige.
We have previously shown that in such asymmetric
interactions, potential victims that lack the ability to retalia
against exploitation might nevertheless exert a degree
control over their partners’ behaviour through their ability
terminate an encounter (Johnstone & Bshary 2002). T
current model demonstrates an additional mechanism
which such apparently ‘powerless’ individuals may exe
control. The two mechanisms are not incompatible, and
appears, for instance, that in the cleaning mutualism, clien
employ both tactics, avoiding cleaners whom they obser
exploiting others (Bshary & D’Souza 2004) and al
terminating encounters earlier in response to exploitatio
(Bshary & Grutter 2002).
The form of indirect reciprocity we have analysed
different from that previously modelled, although it fi
well the verbal arguments of Zahavi (1995) and Rober
(1998). Previous analyses have typically dealt with a sing
class of players who in principle have the same behaviour
options (although they may play different roles on differe
occasions). In particular, all players are capable on at lea
some occasions of helping or harming a recipient, and
are on at least some occasions potential recipients of he
(e.g. Nowak & Sigmund 1998a,b; Leimar & Hammerste
2001; Lotem et al. 2003). Under these circumstance
helping behaviour is favoured (when possible) because
tends to elicit help from others. In our model, by contra
‘clients’ cannot choose to help or harm; it is always t
‘cleaner’ that determines the outcome of an interactio
(whether it is beneficial or harmful for the cleaner its
and for the client). Cleaners do not, therefore, a
helpfully in order to elicit help in turn from observe
rather, they do so to encourage clients to approach in t
future, and thereby gain the opportunity for exploitation
a time when it will potentially be more profitable. Th
form of indirect reciprocity could be summed up, not
‘help so that you may be helped’, but as ‘help so that yo
may gain the opportunity to (profitably) harm’. The cos
of helping one client are, in our model, recouped only
exploiting another.As the above description makes clear, the stability
this kind of indirect reciprocity depends on actors gaini
occasional opportunities for exploitation. From t
recipient’s perspective, this implies that an actor’s pa
behaviour must be an imperfect guide to its futu
actions. Since the actor’s state may have changed,
cannot be relied on to refrain from exploitation simp
because it was observed to do so before. Despite this ris
the frequency of exploitation at equilibrium may be lo
enough that on average it pays recipients to approa
actors that have a positive image; at the same time, t
benefits of occasional exploitation to actors outweigh t
costs of the helping behaviour that attracts recipien
because exploitative behaviour tends to occur on tho
occasions when the benefit is greatest (it is wor
emphasizing that helping when the potential benefits
exploitation are low cannot increase the overall frequen
with which an actor is able to exploit recipients; rathe
the strategy pays because it increases the probability th
the actor is able to exploit when it is more profitable to d
so). Thus, both actors and recipients benefit on avera
from their interaction.
Although occasional switching in state is necessary f
the stability of indirect reciprocity of the kind describ
above, it cannot occur too frequently; there must
sufficient consistency in an actor’s behaviour from o
round to the next to make it worthwhile for recipients
attend to past actions when deciding whether or not
approach. Previous models of reciprocity, both indire
and direct, have stressed the need for variation in t
propensity to cooperate in order to maintain condition
behaviour (e.g. Lotem et al. 1999; Sherratt & Rober
2001; McNamara et al. 2004; Foster & Kokko 2006)—
no one ever cheats, there is nothing to be gained
behaving in a discriminatory manner, and reciprocato
(of whatever form) can be replaced, through random dri
by naive cooperators. Most commonly, models ha
incorporated such variation in the form of occasion
strategic mutation (e.g. Nowak & Sigmund 1997)
consistent inter-individual differences in ‘quality’ th
supports a quality-dependent strategy (e.g. Lotem et
2003). Fewer analyses have concentrated on intr
individual variation in state that supports a stat
dependent strategy (though see Leimar 1997 for a mod
of state-dependent direct reciprocity, and Leimar
Hammerstein 2001 for a partial analysis of a model
state-dependent indirect reciprocity). We have conce
trated on such intra-individual differences in state, par
because there is evidence that these play a role in t
cleaner wrasse mutualism (Bshary & D’Souza 2004), an
partly because they are necessary (in the asymmetr
context with which we are concerned) to account for t
costly helping behaviour. While both inter- and intr
individual differences in the propensity of actors to explo
can favour conditional approach based on image
recipients, selection will not favour consistent helping o
the part of an actor. As we have stressed above, helping
only favoured as a means to obtain the opportunity f
profitable exploitation.
It is also worth pointing out that our treatment
individual variation in state differs slightly from that
most previous analyses. Existing models have mos
emphasized individual differences in the capacity
cooperate or help others, assuming that individuals m
5occasionally be unable to cooperate (e.g. Sherratt &
Roberts 2001), or may find it more expensive to do so (e.g.
Leimar & Hammerstein 2001; Lotem et al. 2003). This
perhaps reflects the emphasis in Zahavi’s (1975) and
Roberts’ (1998) discussions of apparent altruism as an
honest and costly signal of quality. But the handicap
principle is applicable to signals of need as well as of
quality (Godfray 1991; Maynard Smith 1991) and,
accordingly, we have emphasized state-dependent vari-
ation in the potential benefits of exploitation, rather than
in the costs of helping (see Leimar & Hammerstein 2001
for a previous analysis of state-dependent benefits). In our
case, helping behaviour signals not that an actor is of high
quality (i.e. finds helping cheap), but that it currently has
little need to engage in exploitation (perhaps because it is
less hungry, for instance) and thus can be trusted to help
rather than harm a recipient. In fact, condition (2.6) above
implies that an equilibrium is only possible when the
benefits of exploitation are state dependent; a state-
dependent difference in the costs of helping alone cannot
(given our model assumptions) support image scoring. We
have also assumed that actors are always capable of
exploitation, and stand to gain at least some immediate
benefit thereby. In other words, there is always a
temptation to cheat; it is only the magnitude of this
temptation that varies according to state. Thus, actors do
not merely forego exploitation when there is nothing to be
gained thereby; it pays them to sacrifice the potential
benefits of exploitation when these are positive but small,
i.e. to engage in behaviour that in the short term is
altruistic, in order to gain the opportunity for exploitation
when the potential benefits are greater.
It is interesting to speculate that state-dependent
helping, and changes in individual state, might account
in a very simple way for some reports of tactical deception,
in which an exploiter produces a signal to attract and
exploit a bystander (Hauser 1997). Were internal changes
in state apparent to the observer, it might emerge that the
signal in some of these cases was not produced out of
context. A potential exploiter, for instance, may simply
cooperate as long as it is satiated but switch to exploitation
as it becomes hungrier, giving rise to the appearance of
tactical forethought. While one can argue that sudden
changes in state are unlikely to occur, they might explain
some of the largely anecdotal evidence for tactical
deception in the primate literature (Byrne & Whiten
1988; Whiten & Byrne 1997). Although these obser-
vations have led to the development of the so-called
‘Machiavellian intelligence’ hypothesis, the notion that the
complexity of social life has favoured the evolution of
sophisticated social cognitive abilities like the capacity to
use tactical deception (Byrne & Whiten 1988), several
authors have argued that one must separate a phenom-
enon (i.e. the production of a signal out of context) from
the mechanism that produces the phenomenon (Strum
et al. 1997; Heyes 1998; Bshary et al. 2002). A switch in
internal state would be one very simple mechanism that
could lead to the production of signals seemingly out of
context, without implying any understanding on the part
of the signaller as to why that might yield benefits at the
expense of the recipient.
We end by emphasizing that although our model was
prompted by the cleaner wrasse mutualism, the same form
of indirect reciprocity may operate in any other, similarlyasymmetrical system. For instance, a case that has several
similarities with our model is that of food calling by
domestic cockerels. Often, such calls are produced when
cockerels find a food source, and they offer the food to
their hens. Hens never reciprocate such food sharing.
However, cocks sometimes utter the call when there is no
food and quite often copulate with approaching hens
(Hauser 1997). This suggests a situation similar to that
proposed in our analysis, in which the cockerels altruis-
tically supply food, with no hope of reciprocation, in order
to obtain the occasional opportunity for selfish mating.
Our suggestion is that apparent altruism may often serve,
not to elicit reciprocal help, but rather to facilitate
subsequent exploitation of observers.
We thank Oistein Holen and Arnon Lotem for their helpful
comments and discussion. This research was supported by
NERC grant NER/A/S/2002/00898.APPENDIX A
Suppose that in the population under consideration, a rare
mutant actor type arises, which harms when in state i with
probability pi , and otherwise helps. Let f
m
iCðnÞ denote the
probability that such an actor is in state i at the start of
round n and was not observed harming a recipient in the
previous round, and let f miKðnÞ denote the probability that
such an actor is in state i and was observed harming a
recipient in the previous round. These probabilities
change from one round to the next according to the
difference equations
f m1CðnC1ÞZ f m1CðnÞð1K s1Þð1K p1eÞC f m1KðnÞð1K s1Þ
C f m2CðnÞs2ð1K p2eÞC f m2KðnÞs2; ðA 1aÞ
f m1KðnC1ÞZ f m1CðnÞð1K s1Þp1eC f m2CðnÞs2p2e; ðA 1bÞ
f m2CðnC1ÞZ f m1CðnÞs1ð1K p1eÞC f m1KðnÞs1
C f m2CðnÞð1K s2Þð1K p2eÞC f m2KðnÞð1K s2Þ;
ðA 1cÞ
f m2KðnC1ÞZ f m1CðnÞs1p1eC f m2CðnÞð1K s2Þp2e; ðA 1dÞ
converging to the values
f^
m
1CZ
s2
s1C s2
1Cp2ð1K s1K s2Þe
1Cp1ð1K s1ÞeCp2ð1K s2ÞeCp1p2ð1K s1K s2Þe2
f^
m
1KZ
s2
s1C s2
p1ð1K s1ÞeCp2s1eCp1p2ð1K s1K s2Þe2
1Cp1ð1K s1ÞeCp2ð1K s2ÞeCp1p2ð1K s1K s2Þe2
f^
m
2CZ
s1
s1C s2
1Cp1ð1K s1K s2Þe
1Cp1ð1K s1ÞeCp2ð1K s2ÞeCp1p2ð1K s1K s2Þe2
and
f^
m
2KZ
s1
s1C s2
p1s2eCp2ð1K s2ÞeCp1p2ð1K s1K s2Þe2
1Cp1ð1K s1ÞeCp2ð1K s2ÞeCp1p2ð1K s1K s2Þe2
:
ðA 2Þ
The long-term average pay-off per round to the mutant
therefore converges to
Wmðp1; p2ÞZ f^ m1Cðp1x1Kð1K p1Þy1ÞC f^ m2Cðp2x2Kð1K p2Þy2Þ:
ðA 3Þ
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6Differentiating Wm with respect to p1, we find that
vWmðp1; p2Þ
vp1
Z
s2ð1C ð1K s1K s2Þep2Þ
ðs1C s2Þ 1Cp1ð1K s1ÞeCp2ð1K s2ÞeCp1p2ð1K s1K s2Þe2
 2
! x1ð1Cp2ð1K s2ÞeÞCy1ð1C ð1K s1ÞeCp2ð1K s2Þe

Cp2ð1K s1K s2Þe2ÞCy2ð1K p2Þs1eK x2p2s1e

; ðA 4Þ
which (since x1Ox2) must be positive, so we may restrict
our attention to mutants for which p1Z1. Differentiating
Wm(1, p2) with respect to p2, we then find that
vWmð1; p2Þ
vp1
Z
s1
s1C s2
ð1C ð1K s1K s2ÞeÞ
1C ð1K s1ÞeCp2ð1K s2ÞeCp2ð1K s1K s2Þe2
 2
! ð1C ð1K s1ÞeÞx2C ð1CeÞð1C 1K s1K s2
 
eÞy2K s2ex1
 
;
ðA 5Þ
which is of the same sign as
ð1C ð1K s1ÞeÞx2C ð1CeÞð1C ð1K s1K s2ÞeÞy2K s2ex1:
ðA 6Þ
It follows that the established strategy of conditional
help, for which p1Z1 and p2Z0, is strictly optimal if and
only if
x1O
1C ð1K s1Þe
s2e
x2C
ð1CeÞð1C ð1K s1K s2ÞeÞ
s2e
y2;
ðA
as stated in the text.k,
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